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Kassman: Driving While Intoxicated

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND DRIVING WHILE
INTOXICATED:
WHEN DOES A POLICE OFFICER NEED A WARRANT?
Marra Kassman *
I.

INTRODUCTION

Every fifty-three minutes, someone in the United States is
killed in a drunk driving-related accident. 1 In 2011 alone, 11,397
people were killed in drunk driving accidents by drivers who had
over a .08 blood alcohol concentration (BAC), which is the legal
limit in the United States. 2 Many drivers (at least 24% in 2011)
refuse to perform a Breathalyzer test upon being pulled over for a
suspected drunk driving arrest because they believe that it is an
invasion of their right to privacy, they are innocent of the crime, or
they simply do not want to be in trouble with the law. 3 Because of
the high rate of refusal, all fifty states have adopted implied consent
laws, which “require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor
vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested

*Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center, J.D. Candidate 2018; Marist College, B.A.,
in Psychology, minor in Pre-Law, 2015. I would like to thank my incredible family for all
their support and love throughout this process. I especially want to recognize my parents
and my boyfriend for their constant encouragement in all aspects of my life. Finally, I would
like to give a special thank you to Professor Seplowitz, my faculty advisor, for always
believing in me and helping me mold this paper into what it is today, Professor Shaw for his
insight on this topic, and to my editor, Jessica Vogele, for her assistance, advice, mentorship,
and friendship.
1 About Drunk Driving, MADD, http://www.madd.org/drunk-driving/about/ (last visited
Feb. 9, 2017).
2 Lawrence Blincoe et al., The Economic and Societal Impact of Motor Vehicle Crashes,
2010 (Revised), NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION 148 (May 2015),
https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812013.
3 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2169 (2016); See also Namuswe et al.,
Breath Test Refusal Rates in the United States-2011 Update, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (Mar. 2014), http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/nti/pdf/Breath_Test_
Refusal_Rates- 811881.pdf.
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or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense.” 4
Drivers who fail to comply with an implied consent law could face
suspension of their driver’s licenses. 5 The issue then becomes
whether the implied consent laws “violate the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against unreasonable searches.” 6
The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects the
right to privacy by requiring law enforcement officers to obtain
warrants to search individuals or seize property from individuals. 7
When the Fourth Amendment was first drafted, the Founders
could not possibly have contemplated the technological advances in
modern law enforcement, the military, transportation, and
communications. 8 The U.S. Supreme Court recently held in
Birchfield v. North Dakota 9 that the Fourth Amendment allows police
officers to perform breath tests without first obtaining a warrant on
individuals suspected of Driving-While-Intoxicated (“DWI”). 10
However, the Court also held that the Fourth Amendment requires
police officers to obtain a warrant to perform blood tests on
individuals suspected of DWIs 11 because blood tests are “more
intrusive” than breath tests and could be deemed reasonable by one
person but not reasonable to another. 12
Section II will discuss the history of the Fourth Amendment
and its requirements. Section III will set forth the various exceptions
to the warrant requirement that are acceptable under the Fourth
Amendment. Section IV will analyze the Fourth Amendment’s
impact on DWIs. Section V will discuss the Supreme Court’s ruling
in Birchfield and its effect on searches and seizures under the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.13 Specifically, this section will
argue that Justice Sotomayor’s dissenting opinion in Birchfield was
correct in warning that the Fourth Amendment will lose its meaning
4

Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013).
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2169 (2016).
6 Id. at 2167.
7 Amend IV Search and Seizure, NAT’L CONSTITUTION CTR., http://constitutioncenter.org/
interactive-constitution/amendments/amendment-iv (last visited Feb. 9, 2016).
8 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, §
1.1(a) (5th ed. 2015).
9 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2184 (2016).
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id. (holding that blood tests can only be performed in DWI cases when the police
officer has a warrant).
13 Id. at. 2160 (2016); U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
5
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if the Court continues to rule in favor of warrantless searches. 14
Section VI will examine the corrosion of the Fourth Amendment and
how its meaning has been diminished over time. Overall, this Note
will conclude that the Court’s ruling in Birchfield 15 has created yet
another unnecessary and questionable exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement.
Additionally, the warrant
requirement for a blood test, but not for a breath test, is confusing and
misleading because both tests are related to DWI stops and both tests
involve intrusions into an individual’s body. 16
II.

THE HISTORY OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT

At the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787,
where the Constitution was originally ratified, the Constitution did
not contain a Bill of Rights, 17 and the Federalists and the AntiFederalists argued over its necessity. 18 While the Federalists argued
that a Bill of Rights was unnecessary “because the people and the
states kept any powers not given to the federal government,” 19 the
Anti-Federalists, fearing a strong centralized government, argued that
a Bill of Rights was crucial to guarantee “that the new government
would not trample upon their newly won freedoms.” 20 As such,
President George Washington appointed James Madison, an AntiFederalist, to spearhead the writing of the Bill of Rights, which
included the Fourth Amendment. 21

14

See Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2187 (2016).
Id. at 2160.
16 Id.
17 LaFave, supra note 8.
18 Bill of Rights of the United States of America (1791), BILL OF RIGHTS INSTITUTE,
https://www.billofrightsinstitute.org/founding-documents/bill-of-rights/ (last visited Feb. 14,
2017).
19 Id.
20 The Bill of Rights: A Brief History, ALCU.ORG, https://www.aclu.org/other/bill-rightsbrief-history (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).
21 LaFave, supra note 8; U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.”).
15
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The Fourth Amendment is partly based on English law. 22 The
English maxim that “every man’s house is his castle” prevented the
King’s sheriff from entering the home. 23 However, the King’s agents
could gain entry to the home if proper notice was provided, 24 even
though there was no specific formula to provide such notice. 25 For
example, in 1757, the Court of the King’s Bench in Curtis’ Case26
instructed officers of the King’s Bench to kick down the door of a
residence while trying to serve a warrant for arrest for breach of the
peace after “having demanded admittance and giv[ing] due notice of
their warrant.” 27 There, the court held that it was enough that the
defendant knew the officers were not coming into his home as
trespassers but were instead acting in their authority under the law
and the King’s orders to enter his residence. 28 Learning from the
experiences of the English and understanding the issues of the
unclear English search and seizure procedures, the U.S. Founders
knew they had to implement a proper warrant procedure for law
enforcement officers to gain entry to a person’s home or to seize a
person’s property. 29
The Fourth Amendment also grew out of the experiences of
the colonists, who needed protection from the “writs of assistance,”
which were “general warrants” allowing for British law
enforcement’s entry into smugglers’ homes to remove prohibited
goods. 30 Additionally, British law enforcement entered homes and
seized items from individuals “for the purpose of enforcing customs,
duties, and other revenue-raising measures” 31 under the Sugar Act of
1764 and the Stamp Act. 32 The colonists, furious over these
measures, revolted by protesting these taxes as restrictions on their
22 The Fourth Amendment 1199, GPO, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN1992/pdf/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-5.pdf (last visited Feb. 17, 2017) (citing 1 B. Schwartz,
The Bill Of Rights: A Documentary History 199, 205–06 (1971).
23 Id. (citing 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604)).
24 Id.
25 Mark Josephson, Note, Fourth Amendment—Must Police Knock and Announce
Themselves before Kicking in the Door of a House, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1229,
1236-37 (1996).
26 Id. (citing 168 Eng. Rep. 67 (F.B. 1757)).
27 Id. (quoting 168 Eng. Rep. at 68 (F.B. 1757)).
28 Id.
29 The Fourth Amendment, supra note 22.
30 The Fourth Amendment, supra note 22, at 1199.
31 ANDREW E. TASLITZ, RECONSTRUCTING THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 23 (2006).
32 Id.
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liberty. 33 Ultimately, the use of “general warrants, writs of
assistance, and the like to promote collection of government levies”
came to a halt when the Bill of Rights was finally added to the
Constitution in 1791. 34
Today, the Fourth Amendment allows for law enforcement
officers to obtain a warrant 35 to search a person, item, or place if
there is probable cause that criminal activity is taking place. 36
Probable cause requires more than a “mere suspicion” by law
enforcement. 37 Since probable cause is not defined within the Fourth
Amendment itself, the U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates38
defined it as a “totality of the circumstances” that is “not technical”
but based on “factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” 39 The
Court also defined probable cause in United States v. Regan 40 as “the
level of suspicion necessary to justify intrusions by the government
into a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.” 41 In other words,
probable cause must be justified and is considered under the standard
of an ordinary, reasonable person in light of the circumstances
presented.
In order to obtain a search warrant, law enforcement officers
must explain to a judge or magistrate that there is probable cause to
search or seize. 42 Officers do not need to present evidence at this
stage of the proceeding, but they must explain why they have
probable cause either directly to the judge or magistrate or in the
form of an affidavit. 43 They must also describe in detail where the
search will be conducted and what items (if any) they plan to seize.44
However, if time does not allow for the officers to appear in court to

33

Id.
Id. at 32.
35 Payton v. N.Y., 445 U.S. 573, 586 (1980). (“[I]t is a basic principle of Fourth
Amendment law that searches and seizures…without a warrant are presumptively
unreasonable.”).
36 Id. at 584-85.
37 Leonard W. Levy, Origins of the Fourth Amendment, 114 POL. SCI. Q., 93 (1999).
38 462 U.S. 213, 231 (1983).
39 Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949)).
40 United States v. Regan, 281 F. Supp. 2d 795 (E.D. Va. 2002).
41 Id.
42 FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(d) (1944).
43 Id.
44 Id.
34
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obtain a warrant, a warrant can instead be issued over the phone. 45 In
circumstances where there is no time to obtain even a telephonic
warrant, officers may also search or seize in accordance with one of
the exceptions permitted under the Fourth Amendment as described
below in Section III. 46
Sometimes, when unlawful searches and seizures occur under
the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule will come into play.
The exclusionary rule disposes of improperly obtained evidence
under a faulty search or seizure under the Fourth Amendment. 47 It is
a “judicially created” rule that “safeguard[s] Fourth Amendment
rights generally through its deterrent effect” 48 because evidence that
is discovered illegally is known as “fruit of the poisonous tree” and
will be excluded at trial.49 For example, in Weeks v. United States,50
the Supreme Court excluded letters and paperwork that were taken
from the defendant’s home without a warrant because they were
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. 51 This rule,
however, is not automatically applied when a violation of a person’s
Fourth Amendment rights occurs 52 and is instead used only when its
deterrent effect will “outweigh the cost” of losing the wrongfully
obtained evidence. 53 For example, if a “police officer, on a sheer
hunch, unconstitutionally searches defendant’s house for evidence of
a possible murder” and finds a diary which “names a witness to the
murder, who agrees to testify at trial,” that evidence and possible
testimony will be excluded because the officer did not have a warrant
to enter the house or obtain that diary. 54 The exclusionary rule may
result in the possibility that guilty defendants could go free due to a

45

Id. (complying with FED. R. CRIM. P. 4.1 (2011) which describes telephonic procedures).
See infra Section III.
47 Exclusionary Rule, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/
exclusionary_rule (last visited Feb. 18, 2017).
48 Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140 (2009) (citing United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)).
49 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963).
50 232 U.S. 383, 395 (1914). In this case, the police asked a neighbor where the defendant
left his spare key to his Kansas City, Missouri home, found the spare key, and entered the
defendant’s home without a warrant. While inside, the police searched the home and seized
various papers.
51 Id. at 398.
52 Id. at 392.
53 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 453-54 (1976).
54 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
VOLUME 1: INVESTIGATION 383 (5th ed. 2010).
46
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faulty search or seizure. 55 Therefore, law enforcement officers need
to proceed with caution and should obtain proper warrants to ensure
that the evidence they collect will not be excluded at trial.
III.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT OF THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT

Even though the Constitution is the law of the land, there are
seven main exceptions to the Fourth Amendment rule that a law
enforcement officer must first obtain a warrant before searching or
seizing someone’s person or property. 56 These seven exceptions are:
1) the search is incident to a lawful arrest; 2) consent; 3) plain view;
4) turning over an item to the police voluntarily; 5) search of a car
that could easily be moved; 6) search of an impounded vehicle in
police custody; and 7) the presence of exigent circumstances. 57 Other
common warrantless searches include searches of luggage and
persons at airports, border control searches, and stop and frisks,58
which are permissible for security purposes. 59
All of these
exceptions are judicially created to ensure that the law and individual
rights are balanced against unreasonable searches and seizures. 60
55

Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141 (2009).
See Investigations: Seven exceptions to the search warrant rule, LAWOFFICER.COM,
http://lawofficer.com/2008/05/investigations-seven-exceptions-to-the-search-warrant-rule/
(last visited Sept. 19, 2016).
57 Id.; United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 218 (1973) (holding that “[i]n the case of
a lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search under that
Amendment.”); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 128 (1990) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment “does not prohibit the warrantless seizure of evidence in plain view even though
the discovery of the evidence was not inadvertent. Although inadvertence is a characteristic
of most legitimate plain-view seizures, it is not a necessary condition.”); S. Dakota v.
Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 364 (1976) (holding that an inventory search of a car that was
impounded by police did not violate the Fourth Amendment); Carroll v. United States, 267
U.S. 132, 149 (1925) (holding that since a vehicle is moveable and defendant can drive away
and destroy evidence, an officer can search the vehicle without a warrant to ensure that
evidence will not be destroyed).
58 Search
and Seizure: The Meaning of the Fourth Amendment Today,
SOCIALSTUDIES.ORG,
http://www.socialstudies.org/system/files/publications/se/6105/610507.html (last visited Oct.
17, 2016).
59 Jack Doyle, Airport luggage spies: How officials are rummaging through your bags
without telling you, DAILY MAIL, http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2596433/Airportluggage-spies-How-officials-rummaging-bags-without-telling-you.html (last updated April
3, 2014).
60 Search and Seizure: The Meaning of the Fourth Amendment Today, supra note 58.
56
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However, the Supreme Court cautions that exceptions to the
warrant requirement are few and far between “and that the police
bear a heavy burden when attempting to demonstrate an urgent need
that might justify warrantless searches or arrests.” 61 Exceptions to
the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment should only be
applied when an officer reasonably believes that time does not allow
for a warrant or that obtaining a warrant would substantially interfere
with the investigation at hand. This is because warrantless searches
and seizures are considered per se unreasonable unless one of the
accepted exceptions applies. 62
One of the most noteworthy exceptions to the warrant
requirement is exigency, which occurs when the “needs of law
enforcement are so compelling that the warrantless search is
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” 63
A
compelling reason for officers to enter a home, for example, is where
there is a high likelihood that the residents will escape or resist
arrest. 64 In all cases involving exigent circumstances, officers must
have a reasonable belief that there is an emergency situation at
hand. 65 Reasonableness requires only “sufficient probability, not
certainty” under the Fourth Amendment. 66
Additionally, officers can conduct a warrantless search when
they have probable cause and reasonably believe that inaction could
result in the destruction of evidence. 67 For example, the Supreme
Court in Stacey v. Emery 68 held that “if the facts and circumstances
before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and
caution in believing that the offence has been committed, it is
sufficient.” 69 In this case, Emery, a supervisor at the Internal
Revenue Service, seized a bottle of whiskey that belonged to Stacey,
an employee of the IRS. 70 The Court agreed with Emery that this
61 United States v. Caraballo, 831 F.3d 95, 103 (2d Cir. Aug. 1, 2016) (quoting Harris v.
O’Hare, 770 F.3d 224, 234 (2d Cir. 2014)).
62 Scope
of
the
Amendment,
JUSTIA
US
LAW,
http://law.justia.com/constitution/us/amendment-04/02-scope-of-the-amendment.html (last
visited Mar. 12, 2017).
63 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978).
64 United States v. McConney, 728 F.2d 1195, 1206 (9th Cir. 1984).
65 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 15 (1948).
66 Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797, 804 (1971).
67 Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1575 (2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
68 97 U.S. 642 (1878).
69 Id. at 645.
70 Id.
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was a proper seizure because Emery was an officer who seized the
bottle as part of his assigned duties, and Stacey could have easily
disposed of it. 71 The Court further explained that malice is not an
element of probable cause. 72
IV.

THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND DWIS

The Fourth Amendment is applicable in cases when an
individual is stopped by the police for alleged intoxication. 73 Drivers
may face criminal penalties, such as jail time, fines, driver’s license
suspension, driver’s license revocation, or interlock device
installments, if they refuse breath or blood tests after being pulled
over by law enforcement. 74 For example, New York’s implied
consent law states that drivers who fail to submit to chemical tests
have their license suspended for one year and must pay a mandatory
fine of $500 to the state. 75 However, Arizona, which has the strictest
DWI laws in the country, requires that first time DWI offenders have
an interlock device installed in their cars and pay a mandatory
minimum fine of $1,250. Additionally, courts in Arizona have the
discretion to require community service, suspend driver’s licenses for
one year, and impose jail time up to ten days for first time
offenders. 76
A driver who submits to a roadside Breathalyzer test may still
be criminally charged if the BAC exceeds the legal limit of 0.08%. 77
For example, a driver who has a BAC of 0.16% or higher in North
Dakota, which is double the legal limit, must spend two nights in jail
in addition to a suspension of the driver’s license and a payment of a
$750 fine. 78 In New York, a driver who has a BAC of .18% or higher

71

Id.
Emery, 97 U.S. at 645.
73 Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2163 (2016).
74 Betsy Simmons Hannibal, DUI: Refusal to Take a Field Test, or Blood, Breath or Urine
Test, DRIVING LAWS BY NOLO, http://dui.drivinglaws.org/resources/dui-refusal-blood-breathurine-test.htm# (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).
75 DMV
Penalties for Alcohol or Drug-Related Violations, DMV.NY.GOV,
https://dmv.ny.gov/tickets/penalties-alcohol-or-drug-related-violations (last visited Oct. 17,
2016).
76 Alina Comoreanu, Strictest and Most Lenient States on DUI, WALLETHUB (Aug. 10,
2016), https://wallethub.com/edu/dui-penalties-by-state/13549/.
77 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 39-08-01(1)(a) (2003).
78 N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 39–08–01(5)(a)(2) (2013).
72
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must pay a mandatory fine ranging from $1,000-$2,000 dollars and
can spend up to one year in jail. 79
The Supreme Court held in Schmerber v. California 80 that
“compelled intrusions into the body for blood to be analyzed for
alcohol content,” as well as the use of one’s breath in a Breathalyzer
test, fall within the confines of a search of one’s “person” under the
language of the Fourth Amendment. 81 Here, officers who responded
to a car accident smelled alcohol on the driver’s breath and noted that
his eyes appeared “bloodshot, watery…[and] glassy.” 82 While the
driver refused to submit to a blood test, the police officers
nonetheless believed that a blood test had to be performed
immediately because there were exigent circumstances 83 that did not
allow time for the officers to first obtain a warrant. 84 The Court
agreed, concluding that “the attempt to secure evidence of bloodalcohol content in this case was an appropriate incident to the driver’s
arrest” 85 because:
The percentage of alcohol in the blood begins to
diminish shortly after drinking stops, as the body
functions to eliminate it from the system. Particularly
in a case such as this, where time had to be taken to
bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the
scene of the accident, there was no time to seek out a
magistrate and secure a warrant. 86
The officers believed that without performing an immediate blood
test, the driver’s blood alcohol levels could decrease over time and
would therefore interfere with their investigation of the driver. 87 As
such, the officers in this case did not perform an unreasonable search
because exigent circumstances were present, qualifying as an
exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment. 88
79

DMV Penalties for Alcohol or Drug-Related Violations, supra note 75.
384 U.S. 757 (1996).
81 Id. at 768; see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).
82 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768.
83 Id. at 759.
84 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978).
85 Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
86 Id. at 770–71; see also Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 623
(1989) (“The burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose
behind the search.”).
87 Id.
88 Id.
80
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Besides the Fourth Amendment, DWI stops are also
associated with implied consent laws. New Jersey was the first state
to enact DWI laws in 1906, 89 which required not an exact percent of
BAC but instead only outward manifestations, such as slurred speech
and imbalance, to deem a driver to be intoxicated behind the wheel of
a vehicle. 90 Implied consent laws, which provide that all “motorists,
as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to
consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on
suspicion of a drunk-driving offense,” 91 were not widely enacted
across the country until decades later in 1953 when New York92
introduced the first implied consent law to “induce persons suspected
of drunk driving to take a chemical test.” 93 Essentially, New York’s
implied consent law today states that when people use the roadways,
they agree to follow the law and not drink and drive, and if for some
reason they do drink and drive, they understand that there will be
consequences for their actions. 94 Implied consent laws are related to
a driver’s loss of expectation of privacy while on the road 95 and were
enacted due to “the need to determine a driver’s blood alcohol
content.” 96 The Court held in United States v. Knotts 97 that “a person
travelling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to
another.” 98 In other words, drivers on the roads of any state must
comply with that particular state’s implied consent laws because they
forfeited their expectation of privacy as soon as they entered the
roadways. 99

89

Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2167 (2016).
Id.
91 Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1566 (2013).
92 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2169.
93 Id.
94 Implied Consent Refusal Impact, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC
SAFETY ADMIN. (Sept. 1991), https://ntl.bts.gov/lib/25000/25800/25898/DOT-HS-807765.pdf.
95 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281 (1983).
96 Steven Oberman, Blood or Breath in Birchfield: The Supreme Court Draws A Critical
Distinction, 40 CHAMPION 47, 47 (2016).
97 United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
98 Id. at 281.
99 Id.
90
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BIRCHFIELD CASE

The Supreme Court held in Birchfield, in a 5-3 decision, that a
warrant must be obtained prior to drawing someone’s blood in a DWI
case, 100 consolidating three separate lower court cases into one
ruling. 101 Even though the defendant in each case refused either a
blood or breath test, they were all nonetheless arrested for driving
while intoxicated 102 and argued that the Fourth Amendment required
a warrant in each of their circumstances. 103 The Supreme Court
distinguished between breath tests and blood tests and held that
because a blood test is more intrusive than a Breathalyzer test, a
warrant is required for a blood test of a DWI offender. 104
In the first lower court case, Danny Birchfield (“Birchfield”)
drove his car off the road in North Dakota in October 2013. 105 A
trooper witnessed Birchfield attempting to back out of a ditch off the
side of the highway, and upon approaching him to investigate what
happened, the trooper smelled a strong odor of alcohol. 106 The
officer asked Birchfield if he would consent to a “roadside breath
test” and Birchfield complied. 107 This breath test indicated that
Birchfield’s BAC was 0.254%, “more than three times the legal limit
of 0.08%.” 108 However, because Birchfield later refused a blood test,
he was then charged with a class B misdemeanor under a North
Dakota statute for his refusal to submit to this chemical testing.109
Birchfield argued that the North Dakota statute charging him with
this misdemeanor 110 was unconstitutional under the Fourth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution because the officers did not
have a warrant to administer a blood test, which led him to believe he
was not required to give his blood at all. 111 The North Dakota

100

Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185.
Id. at 2170.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 2167.
104 Id. at 2184.
105 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct at 2170.
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 Id.; N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 39-08-01(1)(a) (2003) (stating that individuals cannot
operate vehicles with an alcohol concentration of .08%).
109 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2170.
110 Id.
111 State v. Birchfield, 858 N.W.2d 302, 303 (N.D. 2015).
101
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Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the statute did not violate
Birchfield’s Fourth Amendment rights because the police officer had
probable cause to believe that Birchfield was intoxicated and that
Birchfield did not comply with implied consent laws. 112 Therefore,
he was required by state law to submit to blood testing or else face
criminal penalties. 113
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the North Dakota Supreme
Court’s decision, holding that a warrantless blood test is
unconstitutional because it is intrusive upon a person’s body 114 and as
such, the “search [Birchfield] refused cannot be justified as a search
incident to his arrest or on the basis of implied consent.” 115 While the
Court listed various advantages of blood tests, such as their capacity
to reveal other illegal substances in a driver’s system that could have
impaired him at the time of arrest, 116 the Court ultimately reasoned
that the intrusive nature of blood tests outweighs their benefit.117
Therefore, a warrant is required to draw blood. 118
In the second lower court case, William Robert Bernard, Jr.
(“Bernard”) was arrested for driving while intoxicated after the
Minnesota police found him in his underwear and smelling of alcohol
with two other men attempting to tow a boat out of the Mississippi
River with his pick-up truck. 119 Bernard admitted to drinking that
night but denied driving the pick-up truck, even though the police
found him with the keys to the pick-up truck in his hand. 120 Bernard
also refused field sobriety testing at the scene and later refused a
breath test at the police station after he was arrested. 121 Due to this
double refusal, officers charged him with refusal in the first degree,
which carried up to a three-year prison sentence, because “he had
four prior impaired-driving convictions” at the time of this particular
arrest. 122 Bernard argued that the Minnesota refusal law was

112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122

Id. at 309-10.
Id.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2187.
Id. at 2165.
Id. at 2184.
Id. at 2185.
Id.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2171.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. 123 The Minnesota
trial court dismissed the charges, thereby agreeing with Bernard that
requiring a warrantless breath test is prohibited under the Fourth
Amendment. 124 However, the Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed
and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the police
did not need a warrant to perform a breath test on a suspected drunk
driver such as Bernard. 125
Unlike in Birchfield’s case, the Supreme Court upheld
Bernard’s charges because the Court ruled that the Fourth
Amendment did not require a warrant for a breath test. 126
Specifically, the Court held that “the Fourth Amendment did not
require officers to obtain a warrant prior to demanding the test, and
Bernard had no right to refuse it” because a search warrant is not
required when the test was administered incident to an arrest for
drunk driving. 127 A warrant is not required incident to arrest because
“the state is justifiably concerned that evidence [the BAC level] may
be lost” over time. 128 Therefore, Bernard’s criminal prosecution was
constitutional.
In the third lower court case, Steve Michael Beylund
(“Beylund”), unlike the other defendants, consented to a blood test
after he was arrested for driving while impaired in North Dakota
because the police told him that this test was required by law. 129
Here, the police witnessed Beylund hit a stop sign while attempting
to pull into a driveway. 130 When the officer approached the vehicle,
he found an empty wine glass, smelled alcohol coming from inside
the vehicle, and noticed that Beylund was unsteady on his feet when
he got out of the car to perform field sobriety tests. 131 His consentedto blood test revealed that he had a BAC of 0.25% (more than three
times the legal limit of 0.08%). 132 After a hearing before the
Department of Transportation, where the arresting officer testified
123

Id.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2171.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 2186.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 2165. This holding is consistent with the Court’s ruling in Schmerber v.
California. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1996).
129 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2186.
130 Beylund v. Levi, 859 N.W.2d 403, 406 (N.D. 2016).
131 Id.
132 Id.
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that he reasonably believed that Beylund was intoxicated, Beylund’s
driver’s license was suspended for two years. 133 Beylund argued that
taking the blood test without a warrant, even with his consent,
violated his constitutional rights under the Fourth Amendment
because he was coerced into submitting to the blood test by the police
officers who told him that refusal itself was still considered to be a
crime. 134 Beylund appealed his case to the North Dakota Supreme
Court, which upheld the lower court’s decision. 135
The U.S. Supreme Court again held that an officer must first
obtain a search warrant in order to perform a blood test on a
suspected drunk driver. 136 Because voluntariness of consent to a
search must be “determined from the totality of all the
circumstances,” the Court remanded this case to the lower court to
determine if Beylund was wrongfully coerced into consenting to the
test. 137 The Court relied on its 1973 decision in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 138 in which it held that when a police officer attempts to
justify a warrantless search on the basis of consent, “the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments require that it demonstrate that the consent
was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion,
express or implied.” 139 It clarified that:
Voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined
from all the circumstances, and while the subject’s
knowledge of a right to refuse is a factor to be taken
into account, the prosecution is not required to
demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to
establishing a voluntary consent. 140
Not all nine justices agreed that the holding in Birchfield case
was proper. 141 Justice Thomas in his partial dissent argued that “both
warrantless breath and blood tests are constitutional” 142 because he
believed that exigency is present when the body’s “natural
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142

Id.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2172.
Id. at 2186.
Id. at 2184.
Id. at 2186; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 218 (1973).
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 218 (1973).
Id. at 248.
Id.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2198 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id.
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metabolism” will start to break down the alcohol in the blood almost
immediately and destroy the evidence of the crime unless an urgent
breath or blood test is taken. 143 Additionally, he believed that the
warrant requirements for blood and breath tests should bypass the
warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment because the Court’s
“hairsplitting [between blood and breath tests] ma[de] little sense.” 144
Justice Sotomayor, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined,
dissented from the majority opinion, arguing that law enforcement
officers are required to obtain a warrants for both breath tests and
blood tests during a DWI traffic stop. 145 Justice Sotomayor believed
that the exceptions to the warrant requirement should be limited,
especially in cases involving DWIs, 146 because “if the Court
continues down this road, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement will become nothing more than a suggestion.” 147 She
also asserted that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement,
particularly pertaining to DWI cases, should be upheld to prevent
weakening of its effect on society and the criminal justice system as a
whole and argued that it is not impracticable for law enforcement
officers to secure a warrant before administering a breath test to a
driver. 148
Justice Sotomayor also noted that there are various delays
built into the breath and blood test process in order to give law
enforcement officers time to obtain warrants in accordance with the
Fourth Amendment. 149 She first clarified that DWI stops are
different from those portrayed in the movies and on TV because
drivers, in real life, are not pulled over and then immediately forced
to submit to Breathalyzer tests on the side of the road. 150 The
“standard evidentiary breath test” actually used is typically given
after the driver has been arrested and taken back to the police station
where officers can use more reliable and accurate machinery rather
143

Id. (quoting Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1576 (2013)).
Id. at 2197. Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg agreed with Justice Thomas that blood
and breath tests should be treated alike. However, Justices Sotomayor and Ginsburg argued
that both tests should require warrants under the Fourth Amendment, whereas Justice
Thomas argued that both tests should not require warrants.
145 Id. at 2187 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
146 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2187.
147 Id. at 2196.
148 Id. at 2191.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 2192.
144

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss3/19

16

Kassman: Driving While Intoxicated

2017

DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED

1183

than when the driver is first pulled over. 151 This creates a great delay
in discovering whether the driver was driving while intoxicated,
especially if the driver’s BAC level is right at the .08 mark, and the
alcohol could leave his system before he arrives at the police
station. 152 Additionally, some states require the driver to be given a
fifteen to twenty minute window for “residual mouth alcohol” to
wear off. 153 Residual mouth alcohol is alcohol that is still present in
the mouth and can possibly lead to an increased BAC reading when a
breath test is performed. 154 There are other states that require a
suspected drunk driver be given a period of time to contact a lawyer
before taking a breath test. 155 Finally, instances may arise in which
it can take up to a half hour for a breath test machine to “warm up” if
it is not already on when the driver arrives at the police station. 156 In
the case involving defendant Birchfield, the officers had a two-hour
window to obtain a warrant from a judge between pulling over the
driver for a suspected DWI and actually administering the breath
test. 157 Justice Sotomayor, in pointing to all of these various delays,
argued that law enforcement officers have adequate time to obtain
proper warrants for breath tests in accordance with the Fourth
Amendment. 158
Justice Sotomayor also argued that the refusal rate in today’s
society is so low that obtaining a warrant rarely ever needs to happen
in the first place. 159 In North Dakota, for example, only 21% of
drivers refuse breath tests, while the refusal rate in Minnesota is even
less—only 12%. 160 Even if the refusal rates in each of these states
doubled, the judges and magistrates in those states would only have
to issue one extra warrant per week for DWI-related cases. 161
151 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2192. The majority neither discussed nor disputed Justice
Sotomayor’s information here.
152 Id.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
156 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2192. For example, in North Dakota, the Intoxilyzer 8000
machine takes a half hour to initialize before use.
157 Id. (citing N.D. CENT. CODE. ANN. § 39-20-04.1(1) (2008)).
158 Id.
159 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2193; see infra Section III (stating that consent is an exception
to the warrant requirement).
160 Id. In 2011, California had the lowest breath test refusal rate of 4%. On the other end
of the spectrum, Florida had a refusal rate of 82%. Namuswe ET AL., supra note 3.
161 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2194.
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Essentially, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the judicial system
would not be overrun with warrant requests by simply adding one
more warrant per week to a judge’s already busy calendar. 162
Finally, Justice Sotomayor argued that once a driver is
arrested for suspected drunk driving, that driver is taken off the street
and no longer poses a threat to other drivers on the road.163
Therefore, even if it takes some time to obtain a warrant, at least the
government’s interest in “protecting the public” from dangerous
drunk drivers is already satisfied. 164 The majority specifically
responded to this point by arguing that the government’s interest
reaches beyond protecting the public from this particular driver but
also deters drivers from drinking and then getting behind the wheel in
the first place. 165 In fact, law enforcement officers frequently set up
sobriety checkpoints on the roadside to deter drivers from drinking
and driving. 166
VI.

SLIPPERY SLOPE

As Justice Sotomayor stated in her persuasive dissent, if the
Court continues to gloss over its requirements, the Fourth
Amendment will become “an empty promise of protecting citizens
from unreasonable searches.” 167
She argued that the Fourth
Amendment will become a mere suggestion and could eventually
become obsolete. 168 Justice Sotomayor dissented on another Fourth
Amendment issue in 2016 in Utah v. Strieff, 169 which was decided
less than two weeks before Birchfied. 170 In Strieff, the defendant,
Edward Strieff, was standing outside of his home in Salt Lake City
when an officer stopped him, asked him some questions, and ran his
license through a police database system. 171 After checking his

162 Id. (stating that the Supreme Court has never held that convenience of the courts is an
exception to the warrant requirement under the Fourth Amendment).
163 Id. at 2191.
164 Id.
165 Id. at 2178.
166 Michael F. Lotito, Comment, Unsteady on Its Feet: Sobriety Checkpoint
Reasonableness, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 735, 757 (2010).
167 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2195.
168 Id. at 2196.
169 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016).
170 Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2160.
171 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2059.
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license, he discovered that Strieff had a “small traffic warrant”
outstanding in the system. 172 The officer then searched Strieff’s
person and found methamphetamine in his pocket. 173 Strieff filed
suit and the Utah Supreme Court held that the drugs were discovered
based on an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment.174
However, the Supreme Court reversed because the seizure was
permissible due to the officer’s discovery of the outstanding warrant,
which “attenuated the connection between the unlawful stop” and the
drugs seized during the incident to arrest search. 175 Justice
Sotomayor dissented in this case arguing that an outstanding traffic
ticket, or other small infraction, does not open the door for officers to
search a person for no reason. 176
Furthermore, in her dissent in Strieff, Justice Sotomayor
argued that “the mere existence of a warrant not only gives an officer
legal cause to arrest and search a person, it also forgives an officer
who, with no knowledge of the warrant at all, unlawfully stops that
person on a whim or hunch.” 177 She reasoned that “two wrongs do
not make a right” and that charging an individual for a crime while
violating that individual’s Fourth Amendment rights was
unacceptable. 178 Justice Sotomayor also argued that the exclusionary
rule should have protected the illegally obtained evidence from being
used against the defendant, 179 whereas in Birchfield, she argued that
the seizure never should have occurred and thus did not make an
exclusionary rule argument at all. 180 Similar to her arguments in
Strieff, Justice Sotomayor contended in Birchfield that the majority’s
ruling diminished the integrity of the Fourth Amendment. 181
Furthermore, Justice Thomas in his partial dissent in
Birchfield argued that when the Court draws an “arbitrary line in the
sand” between blood and breath tests in a DWI stop, it uses a case-

172

Id. at 2065.
Id.
174 Id.
175 Id. at 2064.
176 Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2064.
177 Id. at 2067.
178 Id. at 2065.
179 Id. at 2064. The exclusionary rule would have prevented the illegally obtained objects
from being used against the defendant; essentially those objects would have been thrown out,
as if the police never found them.
180 See generally Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2187.
181 Id.
173
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by-case test to determine what is and what is not too intrusive on a
person’s Fourth Amendment rights, creating confusion in the judicial
system. 182 Both Justices Sotomayor and Thomas asserted that the
Court’s Fourth Amendment holdings are inconsistent, thereby
weakening the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 183
Justices Thomas and Sotomayor are not alone in warning
about the erosion of the Fourth Amendment. In 2011, Justice
Ginsburg dissented to the majority’s ruling in Kentucky v. King. 184 In
that case, the Court held that the police can knock down the door of a
residence if they believe that evidence is in the process of being
destroyed inside the home. 185 However, Justice Ginsburg argued that
the majority armed “the police with a way routinely to dishonor the
Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement in drug cases.” 186 Instead
of presenting evidence to a neutral magistrate, the police “may now
knock, listen, and then break the door down, even if they had ample
time to obtain a warrant.” 187 Justice Ginsburg’s argument pertaining
to timing is consistent with Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in
Birchfield. 188 Justice Sotomayor argued that the arrest process during
a DWI stop is intentionally detailed and time consuming so that
officers have ample time to obtain a proper warrant. 189
Every dissenting justice in Birchfield agreed that the majority
was wrong in holding that warrants are required for some DWI tests
but not for others. 190 The outcome of Birchfield weakens the
integrity and meaning of the Fourth Amendment and creates
confusion not only in the judicial system but also to individual police
officers. 191 The Fourth Amendment has many established exceptions
to its warrant requirement and does not need another added exception
for DWI purposes. All DWI cases should be treated the same, and
since the Court ruled that warrants are required for blood tests, then
they should also be required for breath tests.

182
183
184
185
186
187
188
189
190
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Id. at 2198.
Id.
563 U.S. 452, 473 (2011).
Id. at 472.
Id.
Id.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2195 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2192 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 2198.
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CONCLUSION

The Fourth Amendment’s purpose is to protect individuals
from unreasonable searches and seizures and require warrants to be
used in all circumstances unless there is an applicable exception.192
However, the Supreme Court in Birchfield held that performing a
breath test on a suspected drunk driver without a warrant is
acceptable 193 due to exigent circumstances. 194 Conversely, the Court
held that a warrant is still required for blood test purposes because it
is more invasive than a breath test. 195 By holding this way, the Court
carved out a new exception to the warrant requirement under the
Fourth Amendment. As the list of exceptions to the warrant
requirement is already a lengthy one, by adding the exception that a
breath test does not require a warrant because it is not as invasive as a
blood test, the Fourth Amendment is further losing its meaning and
purpose. The exceptions to the Fourth Amendment seem to have
“gobbled up the rule.” 196
The holding in Birchfield is a shocking one, and the dissenters
had the stronger and more appealing arguments. 197
Justice
Sotomayor believed one of the reasons why the Court held that
warrants were not required for breath tests was due to the
administrative inconvenience it would place on judges across the
country. 198 If her belief was correct, then the majority had no legal
basis for this argument because the Court has never held that “mere
convenience” is an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement. 199 If the Court continues to hold this way in future
cases, the Fourth Amendment will become obsolete.
The dissenting Justices in Birchfield are not alone in their
stance that the Fourth Amendment will continue to be downplayed by
both law enforcement officials and the justice system if the Court
continues to send mixed messages about the Fourth Amendment
warrant requirement, as other Justices have voiced their opinions in
192

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2162.
194 Id. at 2173.
195 Id. at 2184.
196 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
VOLUME 1: INVESTIGATION 163 (5th ed. 2010).
197 See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2187 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
198 Id. at 2194.
199 Id.
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past decisions as well. 200 Overall, however, the majority of the Court
believes that the Fourth Amendment is fluid in nature and can be
manipulated as the Court sees fit. 201 Even though the Constitution is
a living document, it does not mean that the Court can dismiss parts
of it whenever it wants. 202 The Court needs to balance the
Constitution’s malleable terms as well as preserving its meaning and
history that the Framers intended in order to maintain the
Constitution’s history and integrity.
Because of Birchfield, the states are now “tasked with
implementing creative and effective solutions to the ongoing issue of
drunk driving while remaining within the bounds of the
Constitution.”203 This means that police officers not only need to be
informed of the changes in the law requiring a warrant for a blood
test related to a DWI but also need to be better trained on the matter
as a whole. 204 As such, Birchfield has a powerful impact on police
officers, judges, and drivers across the United States. 205 The next
time individuals get behind the wheel, they should know not to drink
and drive, and if they do, they should remember that the officer
inquiring into their sobriety needs a warrant to get a blood sample,
but no warrant for a breath test. 206

200

See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
See generally Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2163.
202 See generally David A. Strauss, The Living Constitution, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO
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Gordon, Comment, Blood and Breath Tests-Constitutional Law:
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